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Inertial Taylor Rules:
The Benefit of Signaling Future Policy
Charles T. Carlstrom and Timothy S. Fuerst
This article traces the consequences of an energy shock on the economy under two different
monetary policy rules: (i) a standard Taylor rule, where the Fed responds to inflation and the out-
put gap, and (ii) a Taylor rule with inertia, where the Fed moves slowly to the rate predicted by
the standard rule. The authors show that, with both sticky wages and sticky prices, the outcome
of an inertial Taylor rule is superior to that of the standard rule, in the sense that inflation is
lower and output is higher following an adverse energy shock. However, if prices alone are
sticky, the results are less clear and the standard rule delivers substantially less inflation than the
inertial rule in the short run. (JEL E52, E61)
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One way to describe Fed policy is with a sim-
ple Taylor (1993) rule in which monetary policy
responds to inflation and the output gap. Clearly,
the Fed does not automatically adjust policy
according to the prescriptions of the rule. Never-
theless, there is substantial empirical evidence
that broad movements in the funds rate are well
tracked by a simple Taylor rule. But this evidence
also suggests that the Fed adjusts the funds rate
much more slowly than the standard Taylor rule
prescribes. That is, although funds rate move-
ments are typically in the direction suggested by
the rule, these movements are only partial; thus,
it takes a series of policy moves to reach the level
a standard Taylor rule suggests. This type of Taylor
rule is said to be inertial because it changes slowly
and today’s funds rate depends on yesterday’s
funds rate.
One way to think about an inertial Taylor
rule is that policy consists of both the funds rate
today and the expected path of the funds rate.
Without inertia, policy moves more immediately
and does not indicate where the funds rate is
B
efore exiting an expressway, a cau-
tious driver always signals his inten-
tion by switching on his turn signal
well in advance of turning because
he understands that other drivers’ behavior will
be affected by what they anticipate he will do.
This commonplace example may speak meta-
phorically to central bank policy: If market par-
ticipants are forward looking, then it may be
important for the central bank to signal future
policy moves.
Starting in June 2004, the FOMC changed its
language to indicate that existing policy accom-
modation would be removed at a “measured
pace,” strongly signaling the direction of future
Fed policy. But why adjust partway by signaling
future policy instead of going all the way more
quickly? Likewise, why increase the funds rate
25 basis points at each of 10 policy meetings,
instead of making five moves of 50 basis points,
or, for that matter, one move of 250 basis points?
What are the advantages of a measured pace?
Charles T. Carlstrom is a senior economic advisor at the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland. Timothy S. Fuerst is a professor of economics at
Bowling Green State University.
© 2008, The Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. The views expressed in this article are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the
views of the Federal Reserve System, the Board of Governors, or the regional Federal Reserve Banks. Articles may be reprinted, reproduced,
published, distributed, displayed, and transmitted in their entirety if copyright notice, author name(s), and full citation are included. Abstracts,
synopses, and other derivative works may be made only with prior written permission of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
IIlikely to head.1 This article shows, in the con-
text of a standard, quantitative, dynamic New
Keynesian model, that it is beneficial for policy
accommodation to be removed slowly instead of
in one—or a few—large moves. That is, an inertial
Taylor rule frequently delivers a better outcome
than a non-inertial rule.
In particular, we trace the consequences of
an energy shock on the economy under two dif-
ferent monetary policy rules: a standard Taylor
rule, where the Fed responds to inflation and the
output gap, and an inertial Taylor rule, where
the Fed moves slowly to the rate predicted by
the standard rule. We show that with both sticky
wages and sticky prices, an inertial (partial-
adjustment) Taylor rule’s outcome is superior to
that of a standard rule, in the sense that inflation
is lower and output higher following an adverse
energy shock. However, if prices alone are sticky,
the results are less clear and the standard rule
delivers substantially less inflation than the
inertial rule in the short run.
THE TAYLOR RULE
The Taylor rule has had a big impact in both
monetary policy circles and academic economic
research. Figure 1 suggests why. The rule seems
to track broad policy moves since 1987 very suc-
cessfully, which seems remarkable because it is
so simple: It is set according to only four compo-
nents: The first is the Fed’s long-term inflation
target and the second is the “natural” or long-term
real (inflation-adjusted) federal funds interest
rate. The sum of these first two factors determines
the long-run (nominal) federal funds rate, which
amounted to 4 percent annually in Taylor’s origi-
nal rule. The two remaining factors, the current
output gap and the four-quarter inflation rate,
address the way policy should respond to chang-
ing circumstances in the short run.
Carlstrom and Fuerst
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1 Of course, even with a non-inertial Taylor rule, one will anticipate
future funds rate movements to the extent that future inflation and
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Figure 1
Inertial and Non-Inertial Taylor Rules
NOTE: The standard (non-inertial) Taylor rule is adapted from Taylor (1993). The effective federal funds rate is the rate on the last day
of each quarter. The inertial (partial-adjustment) Taylor rule is the weighted average of last quarter’s federal funds rate and the target
Taylor rule. The exact form of both Taylor rules comes from Kozicki (1999).
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis; Bloomberg Financial Services; Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, Federal Reserve Statistical Release H.15, “Selected Interest Rates”; and the Congressional Budget Office.The Taylor rule prescribes that the Fed “lean
against the wind” when setting interest rates;
that is, it should raise rates when current output
surpasses potential. It prescribes a similar
response to inflation—raise interest rates when
the inflation rate over the past year exceeds its
long-term target.
But mere leaning is not enough when it
comes to inflation. Taylor cautioned that interest
rates must rise by more than the increase in infla-
tion. Given that nominal interest rates naturally
increase one-for-one with movements in antici-
pated inflation (leaving the real rate unchanged),
just increasing the funds rate one-for-one with
increases in inflation is like treading water. There-
fore, the Fed must increase the real funds rate in
response to the rise in inflation to make any
headway. This more-than-proportional response
of the nominal funds rate to inflation, known as
the Taylor principle, therefore prescribes that the
real federal funds rate should be made greater
than the natural rate of interest whenever infla-
tion is above target.
In the simplest form of the rule, Taylor argued
that the Fed should increase the real funds rate
by half a percentage point for every percentage
point that inflation is above target or output is
above potential. This implies that the nominal
funds rate should increase by 1.5 percent for
every percentage point increase in inflation.
(Likewise, the Fed should decrease the real funds
rate by the same amount for deviations below
either target or potential.) Thus, Taylor felt that
monetary policy (in terms of the real funds rate)
should respond equally (in terms of the real
interest rate) to inflation and output deviations.
But the exact weights are not crucial. Empirical
evidence suggests that the Fed has responded to
output gap deviations (at least since 1983) a little
less than Taylor had assumed:
Figure 1 plots this rule and shows that it
remains below or above the actual funds rate for
long periods. One reason for these long misses is
that the FOMC does not change the funds rate as
often or as dramatically as the standard Taylor
itt t
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rule suggests. Instead, the actual funds rate
exhibits a lot of inertia, suggesting that an inertial
Taylor rule might be a better fit. Here the Fed also
looks at the past funds rate in setting its target.
The inertial Taylor rule is given by
where it–1 is last quarter’s funds rate (measured
by the federal funds rate on the last day of the
quarter) and i* is the target rate (the rate suggested
by the Taylor rule without inertia). Figure 1 also
plots this inertial rule. The baseline rule without
inertia is basically a longer-run target that pro-
vides guidance for where the funds rate will
eventually end up. The data suggest that instead
of moving to the target immediately, the Fed
moves only 24 percent of the way there each
quarter. Figure 1 clearly shows that this partial-
adjustment Taylor rule tracks the actual funds
rate very closely. Another way of thinking about
the partial-adjustment formulation is that,
instead of reacting to today’s inflation and the out-
put gap, the Federal Open Market Committee
(FOMC) reacts to a weighted average of today’s
and all past inflation and output gaps.
The discussion that follows shows that,
with sticky prices and sticky wages, a partial-
adjustment Taylor rule delivers better inflation
and output outcomes than the traditional Taylor
rule. This is shown in the context of an oil shock
that reduces output and increases inflation.
OIL PRICES AND MONETARY
POLICY: A COMPUTABLE
GENERAL-EQUILIBRIUM MODEL
To ascertain whether an inertial or non-inertial
Taylor rule is better, we need a calibrated com-
putable general-equilibrium model. Here we
sketch the model used for our simulations; we
describe it more fully in the appendix, along with
our calibration of its parameters. Oil is an impor-
tant input in manufacturing (and, perhaps to a
lesser extent, in services). Oil price increases will
therefore reduce output and (for a given monetary
policy) increase prices. The rise in prices is not
iii t
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that prices are sticky and adjust slowly and that
wages are sticky as well. Both these forms of
nominal stickiness imply that output will not
respond efficiently and will differ from its first-
best level (or potential). That is, if both prices
and wages were perfectly flexible, the output gap
would be zero.
A key issue in the analysis is, of course, the
statement of monetary policy. For the benchmark
simulation, we assume that policy is given by
the standard (non-inertial) Taylor rule described
in the previous section. For the inertial rule we
use the partial-adjustment rate estimated by
Kozicki (1999), where policy adjusts only 24 per-
cent of the way to the rate predicted by the stan-
dard Taylor rule.
MODEL SIMULATIONS
Model simulations suggest that there may be
an advantage in adjusting the funds rate slowly.
Figure 2 answers these hypothetical questions:
Holding everything else constant, how would
inflation, interest rates, and output be expected
to behave following a one-time 30 percent
increase in oil prices? How would these vari-
ables behave if the Fed followed a non-inertial
Taylor rule compared with an inertial Taylor
rule? All variables are plotted as log deviations
from trend. (For the funds rate and inflation,
these are linear deviations from trend.)
With both rules, the oil shock tends to increase
inflation. The standard Taylor rule suggests that
policymakers raise the nominal interest rate to
keep inflation from increasing even more. But
with an inertial Taylor rule, this increase is
smaller and spread out over time. Therefore, the
difference between an inertial rule and non-
inertial rule is that the latter increases rates less
today with a promise of future increases.
This promise to increase rates in the future is
extremely important. With the inertial rule, the
nominal funds rate lags behind the rule without
inertia and peaks at a much lower level as well.
This promise of future rate increases keeps infla-
tion lower than the non-inertial rule as well. Sur-
prisingly, the funds rate with inertia is always
lower than the non-inertial Taylor rule; yet infla-
tion, too, is always lower. This is because the
stance of monetary policy is not given by the
nominal funds rate but by the real, inflation-
adjusted funds rate. More precisely, the policy
stance is given by how much the real, inflation-
adjusted funds rate deviates from the Wicksellian
interest rate (the real interest rate that would
prevail in the economy if there were no price or
wage stickiness or, equivalently, if the output
gap were always equal to zero). By construction,
therefore, the Wicksellian rate is the same for
both the inertial and non-inertial rules.
In the quarters immediately following an oil
price increase, policy is much easier (the real rate
is lower) for the inertial rule. However, this does
not translate into more inflation today, because
in later periods, policy is expected to be tighter
for the inertial rule. A long period in the distant
future, when policy is expected to be tighter, more
than compensates (in terms of inflation outcomes)
for the shorter period of time when policy was
substantially easier. The true stance of monetary
policy, therefore, is given not only by the real
interest rate but also by the real rate’s future path.
Although inversely related, the behavior of
the output gap mirrors that of the real interest rate.
In the beginning, the real interest rate is lower,
making policy less restrictive for the inertial rule
than it is for the non-inertial rule. Not surprisingly,
during these periods, output and thus the output
gap is higher for the inertial rules. In subsequent
periods, things are reversed. The output gap is
composed of two distortions, one arising from
sticky prices and the other from sticky wages.
The output gap from sticky prices is nearly iden-
tical for the two rules (although a little lower for
the inertial rule). It is the gap arising from sticky
wages that drives the difference between each
rule’s total output gap.
Inflation is a little lower in the inertial model
because output and the output gap resulting from
sticky prices are a little lower. Another way of
thinking about inflation is that it is the present
discounted value of all future marginal costs (the
inverse of the markup). Current prices are deter-
mined by marginal cost, as it is today and is
Carlstrom and Fuerst
196 MAY/JUNE, PART 2 2008 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REVIEWCarlstrom and Fuerst











0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24
































0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26
Percent Deviation from Trend
Percent Deviation from Trend





Real Rate (standard) 
Nominal Interest Rate (inertial)





Response to an Oil Shock (Sticky Prices and Sticky Wages)
NOTE: Simulations are hypothetical responses to a 30 percent oil price shock, given that future oil prices behave as they have in the past.
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis; U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics; Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Federal Reserve Statistical Release H.15, “Selected Interest Rates”; and author’s calculations.Carlstrom and Fuerst
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Response to an Oil Shock (Sticky Prices and Sticky Wages)
NOTE: Simulations are hypothetical responses to a 30 percent oil price shock, given that future oil prices behave as they have in the past.
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis; U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics; Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Federal Reserve Statistical Release H.15, “Selected Interest Rates”; and author’s calculations.Carlstrom and Fuerst
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Response to an Oil Shock (Sticky Prices Only)
NOTE: Simulations are hypothetical responses to a 30 percent oil price shock, given that future oil prices behave as they have in the past.
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis; U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics; Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Federal Reserve Statistical Release H.15,“Selected Interest Rates”; and author’s calculations.expected to be in the future. A larger markup
(lower marginal cost) means that output is further
below its efficient level, a negative output gap.
Like marginal cost for sticky prices, the
monopoly distortion in labor markets measures
the difference between the household’s marginal
rate of substitution and the real wage. A value
of unity would mean no distortion, whereas a
smaller value would imply a larger distortion
and thus less output. Analogous to inflation, wage
inflation is the present discounted value of all
these future deviations. This distortion is what
drives the difference between the output gap
measures for the inertial and non-inertial Taylor
rule simulations. Nominal wage inflation driven
by differences in real wage growth is always
lower for the inertial model. This fact implies that,
in a present discounted sense, output is further
below potential than it is in the model without
inertia.
The difference between the part of the output
gap driven by sticky prices versus that driven by
sticky wages suggests that sticky wages may be
crucial to the result that the inertial model appears
to deliver better outcomes. A model with only
sticky prices bears this out. Figure 3 graphs the
outcomes for the model with only sticky prices.
Inflation was everywhere lower for the inertial
Taylor rule in the model with both sticky prices
and sticky wages. But with only sticky prices,
inflation is initially much higher for the inertial
Taylor rule and output is further above potential.
Because of the large inflation jump, nominal
interest rates in the first few quarters after the
energy shock are just as high for the inertial rule
as for the non-inertial rule.
The importance of inertial Taylor rules is
reminiscent of the benefits of forward-looking
language in FOMC policy statements. With
forward-looking language, the Fed moves today
and signals where they intend to move in the
future. Likewise, by influencing expectations,
monetary policy operates off of both short- and
long-term rates. An inertial Taylor rule basically
states where the Fed moves today and where they
are expected to move in the future.
CONCLUSION
This paper has shown that in a standard
model with sticky wages and sticky prices, a
Taylor rule with inertia delivers better outcomes
than the standard Taylor rule without inertia.
This result, however, depends on the stickiness
of wages relative to prices. Recent work by
Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) sug-
gests the importance of sticky wages in explaining
business cycle fluctuations. This lends support
to the notion that the Fed implicitly follows an
inertial Taylor rule because it delivers lower
interest rates and inflation without worsening
output significantly. In fact, for the first several
quarters following an oil price increase, output
is also higher for the inertial rule.
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APPENDIX
THE MODEL
Apart from adding oil to the production technology, the underlying model is fairly standard. See
Woodford (2003) and Walsh (2003) for details. The theoretical model described here consists of house-
holds and firms; we present the decision problems of each in turn.
Households
Households are infinitely lived, discounting the future at rate β. Their period-by-period utility
function is given by
where σ > 0, γ > 0, V is increasing and concave, Ct denotes consumption, Lt denotes labor, and Mt+1/Pt
denotes real cash balances that can facilitate time-t transactions. The household begins period t with
Mt cash balances and Bt–1 one-period nominal bonds that pay Rt–1 gross interest. With wt denoting the
real wage, Pt the price level, and Xt the time-t monetary injection, the household’s intertemporal
budget constraint is given by
The household’s portfolio choice is given by
Following Erceg, Henderson, and Levin (2000), we assume that households are monopolistic sup-
pliers of labor and that nominal wages are adjusted as in Calvo (1983). In this case, labor-supply
behavior is given by
It is easy to see that the wage elasticity of labor demand in this model is 1/γ. The variable Zht in
this labor demand equation is the monopoly distortion because it measures the difference between
the household’s marginal rate of substitution and the real wage. In the case of perfectly flexible but
monopolistic wages, Zht = Zh is constant and less than unity. The smaller Zh is, the greater is the
monopoly power. In the case of sticky nominal wages, Zht is variable and moves in response to the
























































 ,real and nominal shocks hitting the economy. Erceg, Henderson, and Levin (2000) demonstrate that in
log deviations, nominal wage adjustment is given by
where πt
W is time-t net nominal wage growth and zht denotes the log deviation from the steady state.
Firms
The firms in the model utilize labor services, Lt, from households and energy, Et, from external
sources to produce the final good using the constant elasticity of substitution (CES) technology:
The real energy price is equal to pt
e so that a firm’s nominal profits are given by
The firm is a monopolistic producer of these goods, implying that labor will be paid below its
marginal product. Let Zt denote marginal cost so that we have
The variable Zt is the monopoly distortion as it measures how far the firm’s marginal products differ
from the real factor prices. In the case of perfectly flexible but monopolistic prices, Zt = Z is constant
and less than unity. The smaller Z is, the greater is the monopoly power. In the case of sticky prices, Zt
is variable and moves in response to the real and nominal shocks hitting the economy. Yun (1996)
demonstrates that in log deviations, nominal price adjustment is given by
where πt is time-t nominal price growth (as a deviation from steady-state nominal price growth) and
lower case zt denotes the log deviation from the steady state.
Equilibrium and Policy
There are four markets in this theoretical model: labor, goods, bonds, and money. The respective
market-clearing conditions include Ct = Yt – pt
eEt and Bt = 0. The money market clears with the house-
hold holding the per capita money supply intertemporally.
Calibration
We set parameter values consistent with empirical estimates for a quarterly model. Preference
parameters are given by β = 0.99 (implying a 4 percent annual steady-state real rate of return), σ = 2,
and γ = 3. The latter values are consistent with microeconomic evidence of fairly inelastic savings and
labor supply behavior. Because monetary policy is given by an interest rate targeting procedure, the
nature of money’s utility is irrelevant. Finally, we assume that prices and nominal wage levels can be
adjusted on average every 2.9 quarters. Given the other preference parameters, this implies λ = 0.19
and λ
w = 0.0146. For the model with sticky prices only, λ
w = 1,000.
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empirical estimates, we set this elasticity to 0.59, or ρ = 1.7. (See Kim and Loungani, 1992.) The share
parameter, a, is set to 0.02. This implies a share of energy in total output of 6 percent (consistent with
its share in 1989).
The (logged) real price of oil is given by an exogenous AR(2) process:
Estimating this process yields a1 = 1.12 and a2 = –15.
Finally, recall that monetary policy in the baseline experiment is given by
where
Empirical evidence presented in Kozicki (1999) suggests that, since 1983, the coefficients in this
monetary policy rule are τ = 1.44 and τg = 0.14. For the non-inertial Taylor rule, ρ = 0; whereas, for the
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